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Satisﬁcing Negotiations
James K. Archibald, Senior Member, IEEE, Jared C. Hill, Student Member, IEEE, F. Ryan Johnson,
and Wynn C. Stirling

Abstract—Negotiation procedures that are founded on the doctrine of individual rationality, where each participant is committed
to maximizing its own satisfaction, are limited in their ability to
accommodate the interests of others, and therefore, may unnecessarily constrain the negotiability of a decision maker, particularly
in cooperative environments. Satisﬁcing game theory provides a
distinct alternative to the hyperrationality of conventional rational
choice by waiving reliance on the individual rationality premise
and offering an approach to negotiatory decision making that is
based on a well-deﬁned mathematical notion of satisﬁcing, or being good enough, that permits the modeling of complex interrelationships between agents. This approach provides a mechanism to
compute the attitude, or degree of conﬂict or contentedness, of the
negotiators. Examples illustrate both single-round and multiround
satisﬁcing negotiation protocols.
Index Terms—Altruism, Bayesian networks, game theory, negotiations, rationality, satisﬁcing, sociology.

I. INTRODUCTION
EGOTIATION is an iterative decision-making process
between independent decision-making entities as they
attempt to reach a joint decision that is acceptable to all participants. Game theory, as developed by von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1], provides a mathematical framework within
which multi-agent decision problems can be represented and
by which negotiatory processes can be evaluated. The standard
application of this theory requires each player to form a utility function that quantiﬁes the beneﬁt that accrues to it as a
consequence of the actions that it and all other players may
take. A strategic-form game is created by juxtaposing the utilities of all players into an array that is available to all players.
Each player then may assess the opportunities for cooperation
and conﬂict. A solution concept is a rule that deﬁnes what it
means for a decision vector to be acceptable to all players in the
light of the conﬂict/cooperation environment. A negotiation is
a solution concept whereby the players iteratively modify their
proposed solutions in an attempt to reach a mutually acceptable decision vector. Such an agreement, if reached, is called a
compromise. One way in which negotiation differs from other
solution concepts such as Nash equilibria is that a compromise
is not guaranteed to exist. If one is not achieved, then the negotiation defaults to an impasse. To avoid vacuous situations, we
assume that, once a compromise is reached, all participants will
enact the negotiated solution.
Many negotiation concepts have been devised within the general game-theoretic framework, including voting, auctions, bar-
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TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX IN ORDINAL FORM FOR (a) THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA AND
(b) THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME

gaining, arbitration, and market equilibrium mechanisms [2],
[3]. While these concepts are all very different from each other
and each has its own natural application domain, they share one
important feature: by virtue of being couched under the rubric
of game theory, they are all consistent with the classical economics hypothesis advanced by Bergson and Samuelson, which
asserts that individual interests are fundamental, i.e., that social
welfare is a function of individual welfare [4], [5]. This is the
doctrine of individual rationality, that is, each individual should
act in its own self-interest. Under this doctrine, all other agents
are viewed, to varying degrees depending on the context, as
competitors that act to constrain one’s actions. The injunction
to each agent is very simple—it should optimize (unconstrained
if possible, constrained if necessary). Individual rationality is
certainly an appropriate paradigm for decision makers who are
primarily competitive. Negotiators operating in such scenarios would be inclined to use various posturing devices such as
exaggerations, threats, and even outright deception. Much of
negotiation theory is designed to deal with such tendencies.
Many negotiation scenarios, however, possess a stronger cooperative than competitive nature, and in such cases, notions
of collaboration, compromise, and altruism are more applicable descriptors than competition, exploitation, and avarice. To
illustrate the difference, let us compare two well-known games
that are often used as prototypes of social situations: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Battle of the Sexes (BOS). Payoff arrays in ordinal form for these two games are illustrated
in Table I.
PD is a ubiquitous model of economic behavior, and has been
applied to a wide variety of situations ranging from arms races to
oligopoly pricing. The most common instantiation of the game
involves two players (P1 and P2 ) who may either cooperate (C)
or defect (D). If one player cooperates and the other defects,
the one who defects receives the best payoff while the one who
cooperates receives the worst payoff. If both defect, they both
receive the next-to-worst payoff, and if both cooperate, they both
receive the next-to-best payoff. The game has one Nash equilibrium, (D, D), resulting in the next-to-worst outcome for both.
BOS involves a man (H) and a woman (S) who plan to meet
in town for a social function. She prefers to go to the ballet

1094-6977/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: Brigham Young University. Downloaded on February 5, 2009 at 15:29 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

ARCHIBALD et al.: SATISFICING NEGOTIATIONS

(B), while he prefers the dog races (D). Each also prefers
to be with the other, however, regardless of venue. This game
is a prototype for economic scenarios where decision makers
(e.g., ﬁrms) are trying to choose between competing standards.
Although each ﬁrm has its own preferences, both ﬁrms would
sell more products if they were to adopt a common standard.
Resorting to such tactics as threats, bluffs, and deception is
likely only to exacerbate the problem. To avoid an impasse,
it will be necessary for some form of compromise to occur,
and the question is, what could be the basis for cooperation?
Classical game theory offers two Nash equilibria, namely,
(D, D) and (B, B), but does not provide a unique resolution,
hence is completely ineffective in resolving the impasse.
PD is a game of mixed motive and serves as an appropriate model of behavior when the opportunity for exploitation
exists. Cooperation, though possible, incurs great risk, while
defection, even though it offers diminished rewards, protects
the participant from catastrophe. By contrast, BOS is largely
a game of coordination, in which the interests of the agents
largely coincide. With this game, there is little (though not zero)
opportunity for exploitation; either both players win (although
not to the same degree) or both lose. While individual rationality may be an appropriate paradigm with which to analyze PD,
that paradigm loses much of its instrumentality as an effective
way to analyze BOS. Both games have a signiﬁcant opportunity
for cooperation, but failure to do so, while detrimental to PD,
can be catastrophic for BOS. These games also differ in their
amenability to negotiation. Negotiation with PD is conceptually
trivial, since both players receive a greater reward by cooperating than by defecting. Negotiation with BOS, however, is not so
straightforward, since the rewards for cooperating are unequal.
It seems that more must be taken into account when negotiating
than the payoff array.
One concept that must be taken into account is altruism. An
altruistic agent takes into consideration the preferences of others
when deﬁning its preferences (benevolently or malevolently—
altruism is deontologically neutral—Taylor [6] calls this positive
and negative altruism). An agent is categorically altruistic if it
relinquishes its demand to optimize its own beneﬁt, without regard for others, in all circumstances. A classical way to do this
is to form one’s utility as a linear combination of the utilities of
all players [6]. The player then proceeds to invoke the usual solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium. The key feature of this
approach is that the player’s preferences are unconditional. It
has irrevocably re-deﬁned its preferences in a way that obviates
its narrow self-interest. For example, consider the BOS game. If
both H and S were categorically altruistic, they would each prefer to go to the venue that is more appealing to the other. Unfortunately, the results would be the worst possible outcome for both.
An alternative to the categorical approach is situational altruism, where the player conditionally relinquishes its narrow
self-interest if, but only if, the other wishes to take advantage
of the offered largesse. Otherwise, the agent would be governed
by its egoistic preferences and would avoid needless sacriﬁce.
In the BOS game, suppose that H is not a stereotypical machoistic male who has little consideration for the feelings of
his partner. Although he prefers dog races to ballet, let us cast
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him as a somewhat sensitive fellow who wants his friend to
enjoy herself. He feels this way strongly enough to be willing
to moderate his preference for the dog races if, but only if, S
really hates that environment. He may express this attitude by
deﬁning two utility functions, one under the assumption that S
detests dog races, and the other under the assumption that she
tolerates them. Such preferences are conditional for H, in that
he does not commit to either preference independently of S’s
attitude. These utilities can be deﬁned without H even knowing
S’s attitude about dog races. Notice, also, that it is possible for
H to make these conditional evaluations without knowledge of
S’s attitude about ballet.
Conditional preferences are difﬁcult to express via the
utilities that are conventionally used in game theory. The reason
for this difﬁculty is that, with von Neumann–Morgenstern
game theory, each agent deﬁnes its preferences as a function of
the possible actions of itself and other players, and orders these
preferences by considering only the effect that the outcomes
have on its own level of satisfaction. It is not until the payoffs
are juxtaposed in the payoff array that opportunities for conﬂict
or cooperation are revealed. If, on the other hand, preferences
were formed as functions of other players’ preferences as well
as one’s narrow self-interest, then the players would possess the
capability of forming their preferences selﬁshly, benevolently,
malevolently, or indifferently with respect to the preferences
of others.
Optimization (constrained or unconstrained) is a seemingly
incontrovertible solution concept, especially in a single-agent
context. In a multi-agent context, however, optimization is not
always a well-deﬁned concept. On the one hand, the players can adopt a “bottom-up” approach, where each optimizes
its own behavior. However, such behavior may not generate
optimal group performance. As Arrow’s impossibility theorem establishes, it is generally not possible simultaneously
to optimize both individual and group performance [7]. Alternatively, the group could adopt a “top-down” approach,
whereby, acting as a single entity, each player’s actions are
speciﬁed so as to optimize group behavior. So doing, however, may require unacceptable degradations of individual performance and will not generally result in an enforceable solution concept. Essentially, optimization is an individual activity.
As observed by Luce and Raiffa, “the notion of group rationality is neither a postulate of the model nor does it appear
to follow as a logical consequence of individual rationality”
([8], p. 193).
This paper presents a theory of negotiation that is not based
on the doctrine of individual rationality. Rather, it is based on
a mathematically precise notion of being “good enough” that is
fundamentally different from, and not an approximation to, being “best.” Key attributes of this approach include the following:
• it naturally accommodates sophisticated social behaviors
such as cooperation, compromise, and negotiation;
• it does not depend on optimization as the criterion
for deﬁning quality; alternative criteria for quality are
introduced;
• it leads to well-deﬁned solutions procedures and is
amenable to a precise mathematical characterization.
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II. SATISFICING GAMES
The term “satisﬁcing” was ﬁrst appropriated by Simon [9],
[10] as a species of “bounded rationality.” Under his usage,
a decision maker searches for the optimal solution but terminates the search when an option is deemed to be good enough.
The concept of being “good enough,” in this context, is that
the performance attributed to the option met or exceeded the
decision maker’s heuristic “aspiration level.” This usage takes
into consideration exigencies of practical decision making such
as the informational and computational constraints that exist in
real-world situations. It is similar in philosophy to individual
rationality since, if a decision maker could optimize, it surely
should do so. Only the real-world constraints on its capabilities prevent it from achieving the optimum, but the ideal of
optimality remains intact.
For single-agent low-dimensional problems, it may be
straightforward to specify the aspiration levels. But, with
multiple-agent systems, it may be difﬁcult to deﬁne a notion
of group aspirations, and perhaps even more difﬁcult to reconcile group aspirations with individual aspirations. Even if this
were possible, interdependence between decision makers can
be complex and aspiration levels can be conditional (what is
good enough for me may depend upon what is good enough for
you). It seems that Simon’s notion of satisﬁcing cannot be easily
extended in a systematic way to the multi-agent case.
This paper also employs satisﬁcing to mean good enough, but
not in the sense of bounded rationality. There are two signiﬁcant
differences between satisﬁcing à la Simon and satisﬁcing as
used here.
1) Simon’s usage is an approximation to being best (constrained from achieving that ideal by practical limitations).
By contrast, satisﬁcing as used here treats being good
enough as the ideal (rather than an approximation). Thus,
satisﬁcing, as employed in this paper, is not a species of
bounded rationality, in the sense of being an approximation to being optimal.
2) Simon’s standard for being good enough is extrinsic, that
is, as with optimization, options are evaluated with respect
to attributes that are not part of the option. In the case
of optimization, evaluations are made relative to other
options. In the case of aspiration levels, evaluations are
made relative to an externally supplied aspiration level.
By contrast, satisﬁcing as deﬁned here involves intrinsic
evaluations, that is, intra-option evaluations of multiple
attributes of each option without reference to sources of
information outside the option.
One way to form intrinsic comparisons is to form dichotomies, that is, to deﬁne two distinct sets of attributes for
each option and either to reject or fail to reject the option on
the basis of comparing these attributes. Such dichotomous comparisons are intrinsic since they do not reference anything not
directly relating to the option. Dichotomies are the fundamental building blocks of everyday personal choices. Attached to
virtually every nontrivial option are attributes that are desirable
and attributes that are not desirable. People are naturally wont
to evaluate the upside versus the downside, the pros versus the

cons, the pluses versus the minuses, the beneﬁts versus the costs.
One simply evaluates tradeoffs option by option—putting the
gains and the losses on the balance to see which way it tips.
The result of evaluating dichotomies in this way is that the beneﬁts must be at least as great as the costs. In this sense, such
evaluations provide a distinct notion of being good enough.
By separating the positive (beneﬁt) and negative (cost) attributes of an option, we explicitly raise the issue of commensurability. However, this issue is also implicitly present with conventional utilities, since they also typically involve both beneﬁts
and costs, and the decision maker must somehow determine the
relative signiﬁcance of these attributes. A typical conventional
procedure is to form a linear combination of the positive and
negative attributes, with the weighting coefﬁcients being chosen to correspond to signiﬁcance. The distinction between the
traditional approach and our approach is that we do not aggregate the different attributes into a single function, but instead
keep them separate. At the end of the day, both approaches require the subjective evaluation of signiﬁcance by the designer,
who must formulate some rational notion of commensurability
by appropriating or inventing a system of units. The issue was
put succinctly by Hardin: “Comparing one good with another
is, we usually say, impossible because goods are incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared. Theoretically,
this may be true; but in real life incommensurables are commensurable. Only a criterion of judgment and a system of weighing
are needed” ( [11], emphasis in original). To make dichotomous
comparisons meaningful, we must express the beneﬁt and cost
in the same units by insisting that they be normalized (as will
be developed subsequently).
We deﬁne an option as being satisﬁcingly rational if the gains
obtained by adopting it are at least as great as the losses so
incurred. This notion of rationality is weaker than individual
rationality (which involves extrinsic comparisons); it provides
an explicit deﬁnition of what it means to be “good enough.”
Whereas individual rationality may be characterized as an attitude of “nothing but the best will do,” satisﬁcing rationality
may be characterized as an attitude of “getting what you pay
for.” Individual rationality is rigid and demanding; satisﬁcing
rationality is ameliorative and ﬂexible. There can be only one
individually rational option (or an equivalence class of them)
for a given optimality criterion, but there can be several satisﬁcingly rational options for a given satisﬁcing criterion. It
is easy to show, however, that, if computed by the same performance criteria, an optimal decision will also be satisﬁcing.
Both notions ﬁt Nozick’s deﬁnition of instrumental rationality
as “the effective and efﬁcient pursuit of given goals” [12]. Furthermore, as Arrow observed: “Among the classical economists,
such as Smith and Ricardo, rationality had the limited meaning
of preferring more to less” [13]. Individual rationality has taken
this rather primitive injunction to its extreme instantiation as
optimization, but that does not imply the impossibility of other
notions of rational behavior. As we will show, satisﬁcing is designed to permit the agents to extend their spheres of interest
beyond the self, thereby facilitating negotiation. We introduce
the mathematical concepts ﬁrst for the individual, then extend
to the multi-agent case.
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A. Single-Agent Satisﬁcing
Deﬁnition 1: Let U denote a ﬁnite set of options. A mass
function p is a mapping of U onto the unit interval such that

p(u) ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U,
p(u) = 1.
u ∈U

A common use of mass functions is to characterize the probability distribution of a discrete random variable. In our application,
however, we employ mass functions in a way analogous to probability theory, but with a different interpretation. In the interest
of making intrinsic comparisons of attributes of options, we will
deﬁne two mass functions.
Deﬁnition 2: A selectability mass function pS is a mapping
that characterizes the degree of support that is attributed to
u ∈ U in the interest of accomplishing whatever fundamental
goal is relevant to the decision maker.
A rejectability mass function pR is a mapping that characterizes the degree to which u ∈ U consumes whatever resources
are at the disposal of the decision maker as it takes action.
Resources may consist of such things as money, fuel, exposure to hazard, or any other undesirable consequences that
are distinct from achieving the fundamental goal of taking action. The tradeoff between achieving success and consuming
resources identiﬁes the satisﬁcing options.
Deﬁnition 3: An option u is said to be satisﬁcing at negotiation level q if the degree of support for its implementation
is at least as great as q times the degree to which it consumes
resources. The satisﬁcing set at negotiation level q is
Σq = {u ∈ U : pS (u) ≥ qpR (u)}.

(1)

Nominally, we will take q = 1, but it may be adjusted in the
course of negotiation as means of lowering standards in an
attempt to reach a compromise in multi-agent applications.
B. Multiple-Agent Satisﬁcing
The advantage of using mass functions as utilities is that they
can be extended to the multiple-agent case analogous to the
way probability mass functions can be extended to the multivariate case to characterize the distribution of multiple random
variables.
Deﬁnition 4: Consider a set of N agents, and let Ui denote
the option set for the ith agent. The set of joint options is the
product set U = U1 × U2 × · · · × UN , and the elements of U
are vectors of the form u = (u1 , u2 , . . . , uN ), where ui ∈ Ui .
The joint selectability mass function pS 1 S 2 ,...,S N is a mapping
from U to the unit interval such that
pS 1 ...S N (u1 , . . . , uN ) ≥ 0 ∀(u1 , . . . , uN ) ∈ U,
and



pS 1 ···S N (u1 , . . . , uN ) = 1.

u i ∈U i
i=1,...,N

The joint rejectability mass function pR 1 ,...,R N is deﬁned similarly.

Analogous to the way univariate probability mass functions
are obtained as marginals of joint probability mass functions,
we may extract individual decision maker selectability and rejectability mass functions as marginals; namely

pS 1 ···S N (u1 , . . . , uN ). (2)
pS i (ui ) =
u j ∈U j :j =i
j =1,...,N

The rejectability marginal pR i for decision maker i is deﬁned
similarly.
Deﬁnition 5: A satisﬁcing game [14]–[24] is the triple
{U, pS 1 ,...,S N , pR 1 ,...,R N }. The jointly satisﬁcing solution is the
subset of all option vectors such that the joint selectability is at
least as great as the negotiation index times the joint rejectability,
that is
Σq = {(u1 , . . . , uN ) ∈ U : pS 1 ...S N (u1 , . . . , uN )
≥ qpR 1 ···R N (u1 , . . . , uN )}.

(3)

The individually satisﬁcing solutions for each agent are obtained from the marginal selectability and rejectability mass
functions, yielding the individually satisﬁcing solutions
Σiq = {ui ∈ Ui : pS i (ui ) ≥ qpR i (ui )}.

(4)

The satisﬁcing rectangle is the product set of the individually
satisﬁcing sets, namely
 = Σ1q × · · · × ΣN
q .

(5)

The jointly satisﬁcing set Σq represents the subset of option
vectors that are collectively satisﬁcing for the group, in the sense
that the beneﬁts to the group dominate the costs to the group.
However, it is important to appreciate that this concept does not
presuppose that there is a cohesive notion of group preference.
If the group is purely competitive, such as would be the case
with a zero-sum game, then the group “preference” may be to
oppose each other, and the individual preferences as obtained
as marginals will be consistent with narrow self-interest. On the
other hand, if the group is committed to achieving a coherent
collective goal, then a well-deﬁned group preference may obtain, and the individual preference marginals will be consistent
with cooperative behavior, even at the expense of individual
beneﬁt.
In general, the satisﬁcing rectangle will not be the same as
the jointly satisﬁcing set; they may even be disjoint. However,
the following theorem relates the two sets.
Theorem 1: The Negotiation Theorem: If ui is individually
satisﬁcing for agent i, that is, ui ∈ Σiq , then it must be the ith
element of some jointly satisﬁcing vector u ∈ Σq .
Proof: We
will
establish
the
contrapositive,
namely, that if ui is not the ith element of any
u ∈ Σq , then ui ∈ Σiq . Without loss of generality, let i = 1.
By hypothesis, pS 1 ,...,S N (u1 , v) < qp
R 1 ,...,R N (u1 , v) for
allv ∈ U2 × · · · × UN , so pS 1 (u1 ) = v pS 1 ···S N (u1 , v) <
q v pR 1 ,...,R N (u1 , v) = qpR 1 (u1 ), hence u1 ∈ Σ1q .

Thus, if an option vector is individually satisﬁcing, it is part
of a jointly satisﬁcing vector, although it need not be part of all
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jointly satisﬁcing vectors. The converse, however, is not true:
if ui is the ith element of a jointly satisﬁcing vector, it is not
necessarily individually satisﬁcing for agent i. The signiﬁcance
of this theorem for negotiation is that no one is ever completely
frozen out of a deal—every decision maker has, from its own
perspective, a seat at the negotiating table. This is perhaps the
weakest condition under which negotiations are possible.
Deﬁnition 6: The compromise set at negotiation level q is
the intersection of the jointly satisﬁcing set and the satisﬁcing
rectangle: C = Σq ∩ .
The elements of C comprise the set of options that are simultaneously good enough for the group and good enough for
each individual. If this set is empty, then successive rounds of
negotiation may be performed by incrementally lowering the
negotiation index q until C = ∅.
C. Interdependence
Since the behavior of the group is dependent on the structure
of the joint selectability and rejectability mass functions, it is imperative that we understand exactly how these functions are created. To understand this process, it is necessary to deﬁne a more
fundamental concept, that of interdependence. An act by any
individual member of a multi-agent system has possible ramiﬁcations for the entire system. Some participants may be beneﬁted
by the act, some may be damaged, and some may be indifferent.
Furthermore, although an individual may perform the act in its
own interest or for the beneﬁt of others or the entire system, the
act is usually not implemented free of cost. Resources are expended, or risk is taken, or some other penalty or unpleasant consequence is incurred, perhaps by the individual whose act it is,
perhaps by other participants, and perhaps by the entire system.
Although these undesirable consequences may be deﬁned independently from the beneﬁts, the measures associated with beneﬁts and costs cannot be speciﬁed independently of each other,
due to the possibility of interaction. A critical aspect of modeling
the behavior of such a system, therefore, is the means of representing the interdependence of both positive and negative consequences of all possible joint options that could be undertaken.
Deﬁnition 7: The interdependence mass function
pS 1 ,...,S N R 1 ,...,R N is a mapping from U × U to the unit
interval such that
pS 1 ,...,S N R 1 ,...,R N (u1 , . . . , uN ; v1 , . . . , vN ) ≥ 0
and



pS 1 ···S N R 1 ···R N (u1 , . . . , uN ; v1 , . . . , vN ) = 1.

u i ∈U i ,v j ∈U j
i,j =1,...,N

The joint selectability and rejectability mass functions may then
be obtained from the interdependence function as
pS 1 ···S N (u1 , . . . , uN ) =

pS 1 ···S N R 1 ···R N (u1 , . . . , uN ; v1 , . . . , vN )
v i ∈U i
i=1,...,N

(6)

pR 1 ···R N (v1 , . . . , vN ) =

pS 1 ···S N R 1 ···R N (u1 , . . . , uN ; v1 , . . . , vN ).

(7)

u i ∈U i
i=1,...,N

A useful way to view the interdependence function is that
each decision maker possesses two selves, or roles. One self
considers only the positive, or selectable, attributes of the options under consideration, and the other self considers only the
negative, or rejectable, attributes. The interdependence function
then describes the collective attitude of the group when considering both selves of every member of the group with respect to
selecting option vector (u1 , . . . , uN ) and rejecting option vector (v1 , . . . , vN ). This structure provides a framework within
which all conceivable relationships can be expressed. The special case when vi = ui characterizes the conﬂict that arises
between the two selves because of the desire to select an option on the basis of its expediency, but also desiring to reject
it because of its expense. In the single-agent case, it is reasonable to assume that the criteria that deﬁne selectable attributes
are distinct from the criteria that deﬁne rejectable attributes.
In that case, because selectability and rejectability are independent, the interdependence function would factor into the
product pS R (u; v) = pS (u)pR (v), but this factorization is not
required by the theory. In the multiple-agent case, however, one
participant’s rejectability, say, may inﬂuence another player’s
selectability, so it is not generally true that the interdependence
function factors into the product of the joint selectability and
rejectability functions.
III. A SOCIOLOGY FOR NEGOTIATION
For cooperative negotiatory scenarios where the agents must
work together to achieve a group goal, it is imperative that they
function according to a sociology that supports their cooperative
requirements. With the satisﬁcing approach, the interdependence mass function characterizes all of the interconnections
between the participants. They may be derived either from the
perspective of individual rationality, or they may be derived from
the perspective of coordination and collaboration. The interdependence function is a mathematical encoding of the sociology
of the system. Its construction is the most critical aspect of satisﬁcing game theory. The reader may have already noticed that
the structure of a satisﬁcing game is reminiscent of a Bayesian
network. Recall that a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) consisting of nodes and edges, where the nodes
represent the variables of the system, and the edges represent
a conditional probabilistic description of how the instantiation
of a parent node at a particular value inﬂuences a child node.
Similar to the way a Bayesian network is deﬁned, we may
also employ the tools of graph theory to express a multi-agent
system as a DAG. To distinguish between the probabilistic application and our context, we will refer to such networks as praxeic networks. (Praxeology is the science of efﬁcient action). A
praxeic network for an N -agent system consists of 2N nodes,
with each participant having two nodes associated with it—
one for its selectability self and one for its rejectability self. The
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Praxeic network for a three-agent system.

variables associated with these nodes are the options available to
the decision maker and the edges represent the inﬂuence that one
agent’s self has on another agent’s self. These linkages consist of
conditional selectability or conditional rejectability functions.
Each application will have a different network and a corresponding independence function that is unique to that network.
As an example, consider the graph displayed in Fig. 1. This
graph corresponds to a three-agent system where the selectability of agent 1 inﬂuences the selectabilities of agents 2 and 3 and
the rejectability of agent 2, and the selectability of agent 2 inﬂuences the selectability of agent 3 and rejectabilities of agents
1 and 3. The corresponding interdependence function is
pS 1 S 2 S 3 R 1 R 2 R 3 (u1 , u2 , u3 ; v1 , v2 , v3 )
= pS 3 | S 1 S 2 (u3 | u1 , u2 )pR 1 | S 2 (v1 | u2 )pR 2 | S 1 (v2 | u1 )
pR 3 | S 2 (v3 | u2 )pS 2 | S 1 (u2 | u1 )pS 1 (u1 ).

(8)

pS 3 | S 1 S 2 (u3 | u1 , u2 ) is a conditional selectability mass function characterizing the degree of support that agent 3 places
on selecting option u3 given that agent 1 were to prefer to select option u1 and agent 2 were to prefer to select option u2 .
Similarly, pR 1 | S 2 (v1 | u2 ) represents the conditional rejectability that agent 1 places on option v1 given that agent 2 were to
prefer to select option u2 . The other terms in this expression
may be interpreted in like manner.
There are two major distinctions between Bayesian networks
and praxeic networks. First, whereas Bayesian networks deal
with the epistemological problem of what to believe, praxeic
networks deal with the problem of how to act. Second, whereas
Bayesian networks deal with one notion of probability—a measure of the degree of belief—praxeic networks deal with two
“probability-like” notions: selectability, which characterizes the
degree of suitability of options, and rejectability, which characterizes the degree of resistibility of options. These functions
possess the same mathematical structure as do probability mass
functions, with the two most important properties being the
concepts of conditioning and independence.
A third distinction between Bayesian and praxeic networks
is often present; Bayesian networks deﬁne connections between
propositions, whereas praxeic networks deﬁne connections between agent selves. With Bayesian networks, the vertices represent interacting elements (e.g., the states of Nature), and the
edges represent the ﬂows of belief inﬂuence between them. The
vertices of a praxeic network, however, represent the sets of

actions that are possible for the agent selves, and the edges
characterize the ﬂows of action inﬂuence between the selves.
A key feature of Bayesian networks is that the joint probability
mass function is constructed from conditional relationships via
the chain rule of probability theory. Praxeic networks share
this same computational feature. It is a well known aspect of
probability theory that it is often much easier to compose a joint
distribution from conditional distributions by means of the chain
rule than to stipulate it directly. The conditional mass functions
represent hypothetical situations that are often quite simple to
evaluate. They may be viewed as production rules of an expert
system. The power of this approach is that the marginals can
be computed via Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm [25],
thereby establishing the degree of belief support for each state
of nature. (Although the general fully linked problem is N P hard, fortunately, many interesting systems are only sparsely
linked, resulting in a greatly reduced computational burden.)
Praxeic networks possess an analogous interpretation. The
conditional selectability and rejectability mass functions represent hypothetical situations that may occur in a society, and
correspond to behavioral rules that deﬁne how the members of
the society function. For example, given the hypothetical “agent
i selects option ui ,” then agent j should condition its rejectability of option vj as pR j | S i (vj | ui ). Using such hypotheticals, the
interdependence function can be constructed by the chain rule,
and Pearl’s algorithm may then be applied to obtain the joint and
marginal selectability and rejectability mass functions, thereby
solving the satisﬁcing game.
By exploiting and adapting the mathematical structure of
mass functions, we may deﬁne a systematic design methodology for the synthesis of a multi-agent system that incorporates
negotiation.
1) Form operational deﬁnitions of selectability and rejectability, and represent each agent’s selectability and
rejectability selves as nodes.
2) Deﬁne the inﬂuence ﬂows between agent selves, that is,
the ways in which each agent’s preferences inﬂuence the
preferences of others. Represent these inﬂuence ﬂows as
directed edges linking the appropriate nodes. If there is
not a direct inﬂuence between two nodes, then no edge
connects them.
3) Associate a conditional selectability or conditional rejectability mass function (as appropriate) with each edge.
These functions represent the degree of inﬂuence that exists between the agent selves.
4) Compute the marginal selectability and rejectability functions for each node and the joint selectability and joint
rejectability functions for the entire group (or subgroups
if appropriate) using Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm [25] or the sum-product rule of factor graphs [26].
5) Compute the joint and individually satisﬁcing sets for each
node.
6) If the satisﬁcing rectangle and the jointly satisﬁcing set
are disjoint, then enter into negotiations by incrementally
lowering the negotiation index and repeating the previous step until the intersection is nonempty. The resulting
options are then both satisﬁcing for the group and for each
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individual. If the intersection contains more than one element, the option that maximizes the group beneﬁt is a
logical one to be chosen.
IV. ATTITUDE
An important aspect of negotiation is the sense that the agents
are content or conﬂicted by whatever settlement is achieved. Unless a negotiated decision is optimal, in some sense, for all participants, the possibility for discontent may exist. A consequence
of the individual rationality paradigm is that the decision-maker
dispassionately does what should be done under that behavorial
regime. On the other hand, replacing individual rationality and
its attendant demand for optimization with satisﬁcing methodology provides an opportunity for the decision makers to form
assessments of the quality of proposed compromises. In particular, it admits a measure of attitude, or disposition, of the
decision makers that is not subjective and, though it admits
anthropomorphic metaphors, does not rely upon them for its
validity.
It is fortunate if an option that conserves resources (low rejectability) also achieves the goal (high selectability). If such
an option is available, the decision maker would be in a state
of contentment with respect to that option. Many interesting
decision problems, however, are such that the only possible options that achieve the goal are relatively expensive, hazardous,
or have other undesirable side effects. A decision maker in this
situation is in a state of conﬂict. Fortunately, satisﬁcing theory
provides a natural mathematical method to deﬁne such notions
as contentment and conﬂict. Since it is based upon the mathematics of probability theory, we may categorize the elements of
the satisﬁcing set with respect to these dispositions by adapting
the notion of entropy to a praxeological context.
The entropy of

a mass function p is given by H(p) = − u ∈U p(u) log2 p(u).
The classical Shannon information-theoretic interpretation of
entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a probability mass function. For example, if p is a probability mass
function and p(u) ≈ 1, then − log2 p(u) ≈ 0, which conﬁrms
that, since the occurrence of the event u is highly probable, there
is little uncertainty associated with its occurrence (or, equivalently, observing that u occurred does not greatly reduce uncertainty). Conversely, suppose p(u ) ≈ 0. Then − log2 p(u ) is
large, indicating that great uncertainty is associated with predicting the occurrence of that event, or, equivalently, uncertainty in
the outcome is greatly reduced by the occurrence of u . Entropy
is the average value of uncertainty over all u ∈ U , and admits
two interpretations. On the one hand, H(p) is a measure of the
average uncertainty in the outcome of an experiment governed
by p before it is conducted. On the other hand, it is a measure
of the average reduction in uncertainty after the experiment has
been conducted. Putting this latter interpretation slightly differently, entropy is the average increase in certainty as a result of
conducting the experiment.
In the usual epistemic context, uncertainty results because of a
lack of information. We may also deﬁne notions of uncertainty in
the praxeic context. Even if the decision maker is epistemically
certain that a given option is the correct choice, it still may be

equivocal about how well, relative to the other available options,
the given one will perform both in terms of achieving the goal
and in terms of consuming resources. To illustrate, suppose X
can choose among three routes, r1 , r2 , and r3 to take from home
to work, and desires to both enjoy the scenery and keep travel
time down. On a scale of 0–10, X ranks the scenic beauty of
these routes as 4, 5, and 7, with corresponding travel times are
20, 30, and 50 minutes, respectively. Viewing scenic beauty as
selectable and travel time as rejectable, the corresponding mass
functions are
pS (r1 ) = 0.250,

pS (r2 ) = 0.312,

pS (r3 ) = 0.438,

and
pR (r1 ) = 0.2,

pR (r2 ) = 0.3,

pR (r3 ) = 0.5.

The variations in the degree of scenic beauty among the options
generates a type of equivocation, since each route offers some
degree of scenic beauty. Also, the variation in time of travel
generates another type of equivocation with respect to consuming resources (time). These equivocations are manifestations
of praxeic uncertainty. This type of uncertainty deals with the
difﬁculty the agent has in making a decision. If, for example,
all of the selectability mass were ascribed to, say, r1 , then the
praxeic uncertainty with respect to selectability would be negligible. Thus, just as entropy provides a measure of epistemic
uncertainty when there is a lack of information, entropy may
also provide measures of praxeic uncertainty when the decision
maker is equivocal about its choices. Praxeic entropy provides
a measure of the “emotional” difﬁculty the decision maker experiences in making choices.
To appreciate entropy in the satisﬁcing context, we require interpretations of this notion for both selectability and rejectability
that are analogous to the usual Shannon interpretation. Let us
ﬁrst consider selectability, and view the expediency of an option
as the degree to which it leads to success. Then inexpediency, the
degree to which an option fails to achieve the goal, is analogous
to epistemic uncertainty, or the degree to which an outcome
is unlikely to occur. If pS is a selectability mass function and
pS (u) ≈ 1, then − log2 pS (u) ≈ 0, which indicates that, since
implementing u is highly selectable, there is little inexpediency
associated with doing so. Conversely, suppose pS (u ) ≈ 0. Then
− log2 pS (u ) is large, indicating that great inexpediency is associated with implementing that option. H(pS ) then becomes a
measure of the average inexpediency associated with the decision problem before taking action. Equivalently, it is a measure
of the average reduction in inexpediency after taking action, or
to put it more positively, it is the average increase in the degree
to which success will be achieved as a result of taking action.
To interpret the entropy of pR , let us view expense as the
degree to which resources are consumed, and consider inexpense, the degree to which we conserve resources, as analogous
to uncertainty. If pR (u) ≈ 1, then log2 pR (u) ≈ 0, which indicates that u is highly rejectable, thus little inexpense obtains if
a highly rejectable option is implemented. On the other hand, if
pR (u ) ≈ 0 and u is implemented, then − log2 pR (u ) is large,
indicating that great inexpense obtains if u is implemented.
H(pR ) is a measure of the average inexpense associated with the
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decision problem before taking action. Equivalently, it is a measure of the average reduction in inexpense after taking action, or
to put it more positively, it is the average increase in the degree
to which resources are consumed as result of taking action.
Entropy is maximized by the uniform distribution. Let n be
the cardinality of the option space, U (assumed to be ﬁnite).
If p∗ (u) = 1/n for all u ∈ U , then H(p∗ ) ≥ H(p) for all mass
functions p over U , and H(p∗ ) = log2 n. A near-uniform pS
would generate high average inexpediency, in that all options
would work equally (either effectively or ineffectively). A lowentropy pS would indicate that most of the selectability mass
is concentrated on a few options that are highly conducive to
success. A near-uniform pR would generate high average inexpense, in that all of the options cost the same, and none
are inexpensive, while a low-entropy pR indicates that the rejectability mass is concentrated on a few options that consume
a disproportionate amount of resource (and, consequently, there
exists a subset of options that are inexpensive, in that implementing them will conserve resources). For the drive-to-work
example deﬁned above, H(pS ) = 1.548, H(pR ) = 1.486, and
H(p∗ ) = 1.585. Thus, we see that there is considerable praxeic
uncertainty with that decision problem. This is reﬂected in the
fact that, with q = 1, the satisﬁcing set is Σ1 = {r1 , r2 }, and
there is no obvious way to prefer one route to the other. Although
X has no epistemic uncertainty (all routes will get X to work),
X does have a non trivial “emotional” decision to narrow the
choice to a single option.
Deﬁnition 8: If pS (u) > 1/n (that is, selectability under pS
is greater than selectability under the uniform distribution), then
the option is attractive with respect to performance—u is expedient.
Deﬁnition 9: If pR (u) > 1/n (that is, rejectability under pR
is greater than rejectability under the uniform distribution), then
u is unattractive with respect to resource consumption—u is
expensive.
The relationship between selectability and rejectability permits the deﬁnition of four dispositional modes of the decision
maker with respect to each of its options.
Deﬁnition 10: If u ∈ U is both expedient and expensive,
then the decision maker will be in a position of desiring to
reject, on the basis of cost, an option that is suitable in terms of
performance—it will be ambivalent with respect to u.
Deﬁnition 11: If u ∈ U is both inexpedient and inexpensive,
then the decision maker will be desirous of accepting the option
on the basis of cost, but will be reluctant to do so because of poor
performance. The decision maker will be dubious with respect
to u.
Deﬁnition 12: If u ∈ U is expedient and inexpensive, then
the decision maker is in the position of desiring, on the basis
of cost, to implement an option that would also yield good
performance—it will be gratiﬁed with respect to u.
Deﬁnition 13: If u ∈ U is inexpedient and expensive, then
the decision maker will desire to reject, on the basis of cost, an
option that also provides poor performance, and will thus be in
mode of relief with respect to u because it will not be chosen.
These four modes provide a qualitative way for a decision
maker to evaluate its choices more deﬁnitively. Gratiﬁcation and
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relief are modes of contentment, while dubiety and ambivalence
are modes of conﬂict. With the drive-to-work example, X is
dubious with respect to both satisﬁcing decisions r1 and r2 .
With multi-agent decision problems, it is in conﬂictive situations that negotiation is the most difﬁcult. By categorizing
the options according to these modes, the decision maker may
invoke additional situation-dependent criteria, such as task urgency or resource reserves, to facilitate a compromise. These
modes provide additional insight into the process of negotiation, and serve as indicators of the difﬁculty or ease of making
compromise choices.
V. SINGLE-ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
The BOS game described in Section I provides a simple example of single-round negotiation, such as occurs when there are
only two players and each player must choose between two alternatives. To see how satisﬁcing methodology might apply to this
situation, let us cast BOS as a satisﬁcing game. Although we will
retain the traditional story-line, it is easy to adopt this example to
a different context. We must ﬁrst establish each player’s notions
of selectability and rejectability. Although there are many ways
to frame this game, let us take selectability as the two players
being with each other, regardless of where they go. This is the
fundamental goal. The resources available to the players are the
venues they may attend; rejectability deals with the costs of being at a particular venue. The dichotomy before the players is
that the fundamental goal of being together potentially conﬂicts
with the preference for one’s favorite venue. According to the
stereotypical roles of the players, H would prefer D if he did
not take into consideration S’s preferences; similarly, S would
prefer B. Thus, we may express the myopic rejectabilities for
H and S in terms of parameters h and s, respectively, as
pR H (D) = h
pR H (B) = 1 − h

(9)

and
pR S (D) = 1 − s
pR S (B) = s

(10)

where h is H’s rejectability of D and s is S’s rejectability of
B. The closer h is to zero, the more H is adverse to B with an
analogous interpretation for s with respect to S attending D. To
be consistent with the stereotypical roles, we may assume that
0 ≤ h < 1/2 and 0 ≤ s < 1/2. As will be seen subsequently,
only the ordinal relationship need be speciﬁed, that is, either
s < h or h < s.
Since being together is a joint, rather than an individual, objective, it is difﬁcult to form unilateral assessments of selectability,
but it is possible to characterize individually the conditional selectability. To do so requires the speciﬁcation of the conditional
mass functions pS H | R S and pS S | R H , that is, H’s selectability conditioned on S’s rejectability and S’s selectability conditioned on H’s rejectability. If S were to place her entire unit
mass of rejectability on D, H may account for this, if he cares
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about S’s feelings, by placing some portion of his conditional
selectability mass on B. By so doing, H is manifesting situational altruism. S may construct her conditional selectability in
a similar way, yielding
pS H

| RS

(D | D) = 1 − α

pS H

| RS

(B | D) = α

pS H

| RS

(D | B) = 1

pS H

| RS

(B | B) = 0

and
pR H R S (D, D) = h(1 − s)
pR H R S (D, B) = hs
pR H R S (B, D) = (1 − h)(1 − s)
pR H R S (B, B) = (1 − h)s.

The marginal selectability and rejectability values for H and
S are
(11)

and
pS S

| RH

(D | D) = 0

pS S

| RH

(B | D) = 1

pS S

| RH

(D | B) = β

pS S

| R H (B | B) = 1 − β.

(12)

pS H S S R H R S (u1 , u2 ; v1 , v2 )
| RS

(u1 | v2 )pS S

| RH

(u2 | v1 )

pR H (v1 )pR S (v2 )
where we have assumed that H’s selectability conditioned on
S’s rejectability is dependent only on S’s rejectability, that S’s
selectability conditioned on H’s rejectability is dependent only
on H’s rejectability, and that the myopic rejectability values of
H and S are independent.
The resulting joint selectability and rejectability functions are
pS H S S (D, D) = (1 − h)s
pS H S S (D, B) = hs
pS H S S (B, D) = (1 − h)(1 − s)
pS H S S (B, B) = h(1 − s)

pS H (D) = s pR H (D) = h

(15)

pS H (B) = 1 − s

pR H (B) = 1 − h

(16)

pS S (D) = 1 − h

pR S (D) = 1 − s

(17)

and

The valuations pS H | R S (B | D) = α and pS S | R H (D | B) = β
determine the amount of deference one player gives the other. If
S were to place all of her rejectability mass on D, then H may
defer to S’s strong dislike of D by placing α of his selectability
mass, as conditioned by her preference, on B. Similarly, S
could show a symmetric conditional preference for D if H
were to reject B strongly. The parameters α and β serve as
a way for each to control the amount of situational altruism
he and she are willing to offer. In the interest of simplicity,
we shall assume that both players are maximally situationally
altruistic and set α = β = 1. In principle, however, they may
be set independently to any value in [0, 1]. Notice that, even in
this most deferential case, these conditional preferences do not
commit one to categorical abdication of his or her own unilateral
preferences. H still myopically (that is, without taking S into
consideration) prefers D and S still myopically prefers B, and
there is no intimation that either participant must “throw” the
game in order to accommodate the other.
With these conditional and marginal functions, we may factor
the interdependence function as follows:

= pS H

(14)

(13)

pS S (B) = h pR S (B) = s.
Setting the negotiaion index q equal to unity,
jointly satisﬁcing set as
⎧
⎨ {(D, B), (B, D), (B, B)}
Σq = {(D, D), (D, B), (B, D)}
⎩
{(D, D), (D, B), (B, D), (B, B)}
the individually satisﬁcing sets are
⎧
⎨ {B}
=
{D}
ΣH
q
⎩
{B, D}
⎧
⎨ {B}
ΣSq = {D}
⎩
{B, D}

(18)
we obtain the
for s < h
for s > h
for s = h

for s < h
for s > h
for s = h
for s < h
for s > h
for s = h

and the satisﬁcing rectangle is
⎧
⎨ {B, B}
S
{D, D}
q = ΣH
q × Σq =
⎩
{{B, B}, {D, D}}

for s < h
for s > h .
for s = h

Thus, if S’s aversion to D is less than H’s aversion to B,
then both players will go to H’s preference, namely, D, and
conversely. Notice that these are ordinal, rather than cardinal,
comparisons. The satisﬁcing approach fails to give a single answer only in the unlikely situation where both players have
exactly equal aversions to the other’s preference.
Recall, under classical game theory, that if each player defers
to the other, the result is disastrous for both. By contrast, with
the satisﬁcing approach, even though both players are maximally conditionally deferential, the satisﬁcing solution is far
from disastrous—it results in a very natural cooperative strategy
that is socially defensible. Notice, however, that since s < 1/2
and h < 1/2, by assumption, the dispositional mode of the compromise choice will be dubious for the one who gets to go to
his or her favorite venue, and will it be ambivalent for the one
who defers. There are no gratifying solutions—the choices are
difﬁcult ones for both players. This result provides additional
insight for why the BOS game is not easily resolved and why
conventional game theory fails to provide a deﬁnitive solution.
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VI. MULTIROUND NEGOTIATIONS
Many negotiation scenarios are complex, and involve proposals and counter proposals, with each participant modifying its
choices and standards for making choices at each round as it
seeks for a compromise. Typically, each participant will condition its preferences on the preferences of others. Such conditioning may be based on its own selﬁsh interests, it may be benevolent in the sense of giving deference to others to beneﬁt them at
one’s own expense, or it may even be malevolent, in the sense
of desiring to injure others even if it reduces one’s own level of
performance. Even in a non-harmonious negotiation scenario,
the decision makers may strongly desire to avoid an impasse,
especially if the consequences of the group failing to achieve a
mutually agreeable decision are high (and thus all players are
frustrated) compared to the cost of individuals compromising
their individual interests. Thus, there is often an implicit notion
of group preference (if only to avoid failure). Such a notion need
not be explicitly deﬁned at the outset by the decision makers.
Rather, it may emerge as a consequence of their interaction as
the conditional preferences propagate through the system.
To illustrate this type of negotiations, we present an example
that we name the Three Hermanos (TH). It consists of three
agents who act primarily in their own self-interest, but are willing to give some deference to others in order to improve the
beneﬁt to the entire group. This scenario involves three brothers,
Alberto (A), Juan (J), and Paco (P). They divide their recently
deceased father’s land into three plots, and each must decide
what to grow on his own plot of land for the coming year.
We also assume the following conditions.
1) Alberto is the eldest son, receives the best plot of land,
and has ﬁrst choice of which crop to grow. He can grow
tomatoes or onions or raise chickens. Juan is the second
son, receives the next-best plot of land, and has second
choice of which crop to grow. His land will support growing tomatoes, tomatillos, or onions. Paco is the youngest
son, has third choice, and the worst plot of land that can
grow only beans, tomatillos, or peppers.
2) The individual market values for the six possible crops
are, in arbitrary units: tomatoes (20), chickens (19), onions
(18), beans (17), tomatillos (16), and peppers (15). However, if the brothers cooperate, they can grow products
according to three popular recipes with the consequence
that they can make and sell these products and thereby increase their income by multiplying the individual market
values as follows: enchiladas (chickens, tomatillos, peppers) with a multiplier of 3/2, burritos (chicken, beans,
tomatoes) with a multiplier of 5/4, and salsa (tomatoes,
onions, peppers) with a multiplier of 4/3.
3) The resources required consist of seeds (both for planting
the crops and feeding the chickens). In arbitrary units,
these costs are: tomatoes (15), chickens (13), onions (14),
beans (12), tomatillos (11), and peppers (11). Furthermore,
due to the scarcity of these resources, if two brothers
decide to plant the same crop, the cost doubles.
This example, although somewhat artiﬁcial, nevertheless captures some of the important features of distributed multi-agent
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decision making. A centralized approach would be simply to
compute the maximum-valued crop and impose that decision
upon all of the participants, but that would imply the presence
of an external superplayer who could dictate the choices to each
participant. If such an agent were to exist, the need for negotiation would be obviated. Optimization is instructive, but it is
not constructive. It provides a prescription for how individually
rational decision makers should behave, but does not offer a
description of how to achieve the optimal result. Negotiations
are required to provide the process of making decisions.
A. Conventional Game-Theoretic Approach
To formulate this decision as a game in the tradition of von
Neumann and Morgenstern, it would be necessary for each
player to specify its utility as a function of possible actions
of all players. Since there are three players and each has three
options, this means that each player must determine his payoff
for each of the possible outcomes. These payoffs would then be
juxtaposed in a payoff array, and a solution concept would need
to be deﬁned to determine a solution. Although many negotiation protocols exist under the rubric of classical game theory, the
requirement that payoffs be deﬁned for all possible outcomes is
unwarranted, since they are not speciﬁed by the problem statement. Thus, the application of conventional game theory to this
problem scenario is problematic.
B. A Satisﬁcing Approach
We begin by identifying the decision spaces for Alberto, Juan,
and Paco, respectively, as
UA = {C, T, O}
UJ = {T, t, O}
UP = {B, t, P }
where C = chickens, T = tomatoes, O = onions, t =
tomatillos, B = beans, and P = peppers.
The next step is to specify operational deﬁnitions for selectability and rejectability. We follow the general rule of associating selectability with achieving the fundamental goal of
the endeavor, which is to sell the crop, and we take rejectability
as being associated with the consumption of resources (seed).
Using these operational deﬁnitions, we may elicit the following
inﬂuence relationships.
1) Due to the hierarchical nature of the relationships, Alberto’s selectability is unconditional.
2) Juan’s selectability is conditioned on Alberto’s selection.
3) Paco’s selectability is conditioned on both Alberto’s and
Juan’s selections.
4) Since growing the same crop greatly increases the cost of
resources, the limitation of seed dictates that Juan’s rejectability is conditioned on Alberto’s selection and that
Paco’s rejectability is conditioned on Juan’s selection. Furthermore, since Alberto and Paco have no crops in common, Alberto’s rejectability is conditioned only on Juan’s
selection.
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recipe, hence Juan must ascribe his entire conditional selectability mass to onions, yielding
pS J

| SA

(T | T ) = 0 pS J

| SA

(t | O) = 0 pS J

| SA

(O | T ) = 1.

(t | O) = 0 pS J

| SA

(O | O) = 0.

By similar logic, we obtain
pS J

Fig. 2.

Praxeic network for the Three Hermanos.

These inﬂuence ﬂows deﬁne a praxeic network consisting of
six nodes corresponding to the six selves SA , RA , SJ , RJ , SP ,
and RP , which correspond to the selectabilities and rejectabilities of Alberto, Juan, and Paco, respectively. The DAG associated with this network is identical with the one given in Fig. 1,
where Alberto corresponds to agent 1, Juan to agent 2, and Paco
to agent 3. This graph is reproduced with the appropriate relabeling n Fig. 2. The interdependence function corresponding to
this network is identical to (8), namely

pR P

| SA SJ
| SJ

(uP | uA , uJ )pR A

(vP | uJ )pS J

| SA

| SJ

(vA | uJ )pR J

| SA

(vJ | uA )

(uJ | uA )pS A (uA )

(19)

where uA and vA are elements of UA , uJ and vJ are elements
of UJ , and uP and vP are elements of UP .
The next step in our development is to deﬁne the functional
values for the six mass functions that appear on the right-hand
side of (19). Since Alberto is able to deﬁne his selectability
unconditionally, he may do so by simply normalizing the market
values of the crops available to him, yielding
19
pS A (C) =
57

20
pS A (T ) =
57

18
pS A (O) =
.
57

Next, since Juan’s selectability depends upon Alberto’s selection, we must deﬁne three conditional selectability mass functions PS J (· | C), PS J (· | T ), and PS J (· | O). Since Juan is motivated to increase his success, he will desire to choose a crop that
will result in one of the recipes. We ﬁrst consider PS J (· | C).
Given that Alberto selects chickens, Juan may immediately discount salsa, and focus his selectability on tomatillos and onions
(to complete the recipe for enchiladas or burritos). Thus, he
should ascribe selectability to these choices according to the
nominal return on the product he grows multiplied by the appropriate multiplier for the recipe. The selectability mass function
corresponding to this logic is
pS J
pS J

25
49
| S A (O | C) = 0.
| SA

(T | C) =

pS J

| SA

(t | C) =

(T | O) = 1 pS J

24
49

To compute Juan’s conditional selectability given that Alberto
selects tomatoes, we observe that there is only one possible

| SA

The conditional selectabilities for Paco, given the choices of
Alberto and Juan, are found by similar logic, except that Paco
must condition on both Alberto’s and Juan’s selections. This
requires a total of nine conditional selectability mass functions,
but they are of simple structure. For example, if Alberto selects
tomatoes and Juan selects onions, then Paco should ascribe
his entire selectability mass to peppers. The other conditional
selectabilities are determined similarly.
The next task is to determine the rejectabilities of the three
brothers. We illustrate how this is done by examining Juan’s
situation; the cases for Paco and Alberto are similar. We need
to compute pR J | S A . Suppose Alberto chooses chickens. Then
there can be no conﬂict, so Juan simply normalizes the seed
costs for his three possible crops, yielding
pR J

pS A S J S P R A R J R P (uA , uJ , uP ; vA , vJ , vP )
= pS P

| SA

pR J

15
pR J
40
14
.
| S A (O | C) =
40
| SA

(T | C) =

| SA

(t | C) =

11
40

If, however, Alberto were to select tomatoes, then Juan must
double the cost of tomato seed for himself, yielding, after normalization,
pR J
pR J

30
pR J
55
14
.
| S A (O | T ) =
55
| SA

(T | T ) =

| SA

(t | T ) =

11
55

By a similar calculation, if Alberto were to select onions, then
Juan’s conditional selectability would become
pR J
pR J

15
pR J
54
28
.
| S A (O | O) =
54
| SA

(T | O) =

| SA

(t | O) =

11
54

The conditional rejectability functions for Paco and Alberto can
be computed similarly.
These conditional mass functions deﬁne the links between
the nodes of the praxeic network. Once these links are forged,
the joint and individual selectability and rejectability functions
can be computed. To do so, however, we must ﬁrst deﬁne initial
values the negotiation indices for the group and for the individual. Let qA , qJ , and qP denote the negotiation indices for
Alberto, Juan, and Paco, respectively, and let qG denote the
negotiation index for the group (for example, we could take
qG = min{qA , qJ , qP }). Then the joint and individual satisﬁcing sets are
Σq G = {(uA , uJ , uP ) : pS A S J S P (uA , uJ , uP )
≥ qG pR A R J R P (uA , uJ , uP )}
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TABLE II
NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES FOR THE THREE HERMANOS PROBLEM
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TABLE III
FINAL JOINTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY SATISFICING VALUES FOR THE THREE
HERMANOS PROBLEM

and
Σq A = {uA : pS A (uA ) ≥ qA pR A (uA )}
Σq J = {uJ : pS J (uJ ) ≥ qJ pR J (uJ )}
Σq P = {uP : pS P (uP ) ≥ qP pR P (uP )}.
The satisﬁcing rectangle is then
 = Σq A × Σq J × Σq P
and the compromise set is C = Σq G ∩ . If C = ∅, then there
is no set of satisﬁcing options that are satisﬁcing for both the
group and for all of the individuals, and some negotiation must
take place in order to avoid an impasse.
There are a number of negotiation protocols that could be
implemented, with one of the simpler being a round-robin procedure of decrementing the negotiation indices of the three participants. So doing will enlarge the individual satisﬁcing sets,
which will in turn enlarge the satisﬁcing rectangle. Eventually,
the compromise set will not be empty, and the negotiations
can be successfully concluded. A reasonable protocol that is
consistent with the hierarchical structure of this society is for
Paco, the lowest ranking member, to lower his standards by ﬁrst
decrementing qP by a small amount, say Δq, resulting in an
enlarged satisﬁcing rectangle. If the resulting compromise set is
still empty, then Juan would decrement qJ . If the compromise
set still remains empty, then Alberto would decrement qA . If
additional rounds or negotiation are required, then Paco would
decrement qP again, and the process would continue until C = ∅
or until no participant is willing to further lower his q value, resulting in an impasse. If C contains exactly one set of options,
that set is then implemented. If C contains more than one set of
options, then the set that results in the greatest joint selectability
for the group would be an appropriate choice.
For the Three Hermanos problem as described, with
Δq = 0.1, six rounds of negotiation were required in order
to achieve a compromise. The outcomes of these rounds are
summarized in Table II, where the last four columns indicate
the individual and group satisﬁcing sets. These results indicate
that both Alberto and Paco hold ﬁrm to their favorite choice,
and it is Juan who eventually gives in to allow the compromise.
The resulting jointly and individually satisﬁcing sets are given
in Table III. The satisﬁcing rectangle is
 = {{C, T, P }, {C, O, P }, {C, t, P }}
and the compromise set is therefore
C = {C, t, P }.

Hence the satisﬁcing cash crop is for Alberto to raise chickens,
Juan to grow tomatillos, and Paco to grow peppers; the brothers
can then combine these ingredients to make enchiladas. Notice
that every jointly satisﬁcing option vector is a recipe. Furthermore, it turns out that the compromise option vector is the one
that maximizes proﬁts for the group. This result was not stated
as an explicit goal of the negotiation; rather, it emerged as a
group preference as a result of the conditional preferences propagating through the system via the chain rule. This result was
not guaranteed. It obtained because the participants were willing
to lower their individual standards. If they had not been willing
to do so, they would not have achieved the optimal solution.
Hence, the group beneﬁts because the individuals are willing
to be ﬂexible in their choices, and are not intransigent utility
maximizers. A willingness to be moderate at the local (individual) level can turn out to be instrumentally optimal at the global
(group) level. The success of this negotiation is evidenced by
the fact that the compromise solution is gratifying for the group.
The individual dispositional modes associated with the compromise decision are that Alberto is gratiﬁed, Juan is dubious,
and Paco is ambivalent. These modes help interpret the negotiation process. During the negotiation, neither Alberto nor Paco
were willing to budge from their initial choice. Juan, however,
was the one who made possible the compromise. The fact that
Juan’s choice is dubious (both selectability and rejectability are
very low) helps to explain this situation.
VII. DISCUSSION
This paper presents a negotiation theory that is based on a
formalized game-theoretic structure that is as mathematically
rigorous as is conventional game theory as developed by von
Neumann and Morgenstern. Von Neumann–Morgenstern game
theory is based on the hypothesis of individual rationality, and
is therefore of limited value for situations where cooperative
negotiations are essential. Since satisﬁcing game theory is not
founded on individual rationality, it is able to accommodate both
non-cooperative and cooperative negotiation scenarios. This paper has focused primarily on the cooperative situation, since that
is the scenario where the power of this approach is perhaps most
obvious. However, the satisﬁcing theory is applicable to general
negotiation scenarios. Some of the features that apply to the
more general case include the following.
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1) Since negotiation protocols are distributed, it is not required or assumed that all participants subscribe to the
satisﬁcing point of view. Even if a satisﬁcer is negotiating
with a non-satisﬁcer, it may proceed according to a protocol based on satisﬁcing game theory. By so doing, the
agent is able to identify all options for itself that are good
enough as deﬁned by its criteria, and it is able to control
the degree to which it is willing to lower its standards as
it attempts to achieve a compromise. Satisﬁcing is more
ﬂexible than optimization. It provides some friction to the
slippery slope of compromise.
2) Whereas optimization is strictly an individual concept,
satisﬁcing can be a social, as well as an individual, concept.
For any group of decision makers, if the group and each of
its members are willing to compromise sufﬁciently (either
out of deference to others or simply because the penalty
for failing to reach a compromise is catastrophic), there
will exist a joint option that is good enough for the group
as a whole and good enough for each member of the
group according to their individual standards. This does
not mean, of course, that the decision makers are obligated
to accept this compromise option. It means only that it
exists.
3) The interdependence function is able to accommodate
self-interest as well as community interest. Therefore, a
self-interested player is able to encode exactly the same
information using satisﬁcing theory as can be done via von
Neumann–Morgenstern utilities. In fact, satisﬁcing theory
is even more general than individual rationality in that it
permits situational altruism. We do not assert that, under
the theoretical framework of conventional game theory,
it is impossible to formulate theoretical models of social
behavior that go beyond individual interests and accommodate situationally altruistic tendencies while at the same
time preserving individual preferences. However, the extant literature does not provide such a theory.
4) Virtually all negotiation protocols provide rationale for an
agent to modify its position in order to seek a mutually
acceptable solution. Usually, such procedures require the
agent to change from its most preferred outcome to an
outcome that is less preferred. Since conventional game
theory requires the decision maker to do the best for itself, using it as a protocol for negotiation requires some
mechanism for the agent to revise its utilities. Such mechanisms are not part of the basic theory, and there is no systematic way to introduce them without making additional
assumptions that are not part of the game-theoretic structure. Satisﬁcing, on the other hand, provides a systematic
and convenient mechanism for the agents to modify their
standards; namely, they may iteratively adjust q, their negotiation indices. By so doing, they gradually widen their
consideration of alternatives in a controlled way. They
may set explicit limits as to how far they are willing to go
in order to accommodate others, and they may break off
negotiations if they would be required to sacriﬁce more
performance than they can afford. Notice that this form
of compromise does not require the agent to modify its

5)

6)

7)

8)

preferences as expressed by its utilities. Rather, it only
requires it to modify the negotiation index.
Regardless of the notions of rationality, the negotiation
protocols, or any other aspects of negotiation, the success of any negotiating agent is limited by the accuracy
of its model of the environment. Consequently, an important aspect of any negotiation protocol is the ability to
learn, and satisﬁcing theory provides a particularly convenient way to accommodate this requirement. Recall that
the interdependence function is formed as the product of
conditional selectability and rejectability functions, each
of which corresponds to a hypothetical situation involving
the preferences of other agents. By actualizing such hypothetical situations, a satisﬁcing negotiator can learn the
preferences of the other players and thereby dynamically
adapt its interdependence function to the actual situation.
It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to develop
such learning procedures in detail.
Two types of complexity arise with the satisﬁcing approach: a) modeling complexity and b) computational
complexity. Extending the sphere of interest beyond the
self increases the complexity of a multiagent system
model, since it must account for sophisticated social relationships such as compromise, negotiation, and altruism.
As noted by Palmer, “Complexity is no argument against
a theoretical approach if the complexity arises not out of
the theory itself but out of the material which any theory
ought to handle” [27]. If one is to account for social relationships that exist between members of a multi-agent
system, one must pay the price.
Computational complexity arises because of the calculation of the marginals of the interdependence function.
This complexity can be mitigated somewhat by efﬁcient
organization of the computations, using, for example,
Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm [25] or the factor
graph approach described by [26]. Even so, it is well
known that even these approaches are N P hard, and the
computational burden for a tightly interconnected, highdimensional multi-agent system may become intractable.
Fortunately, however, as is the case with many useful
Bayesian networks, many interesting multi-agent systems
will be rather sparsely connected.
A possible weakness of the satisﬁcing approach is that,
by eschewing optimality as the ideal, the participants may
settle on a “good enough” solution that is of dubious quality, that is, one for which neither the beneﬁts nor the costs
are very high. The fact of the matter is, however, that
neither optimization nor satisﬁcing can guarantee that the
chosen solution is very good. Making the best of a bad
situation is not very comforting, but at least with the satisﬁcing approach, the players are able to evaluate the quality
according to attitudinal modes.
Satisﬁcing negotiation provides an explanation for some
forms of human negotiation. In some negotiations (for
example, the TH problem), parties often repeat a
position without an apparent change of state, until at some
point there is an abrupt change in feasible options. The
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procedure presented here provides a model for such behavior: even when from one iteration to the next there
might be no change in the compromise sets, each agent is
lowering its negotiation index and, if it possesses a learning ability, is modifying its models of the other agents.
Other behaviors, such as recalcitrance or openness, can be
accommodated by more sophisticated dynamics of how
the negotiation indices are changed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Multi-agent satisﬁcing theory provides a means of describing
solutions which are individually and jointly satisﬁcing from the
perspective of an individual agent in a community of agents.
This paper extends previous work on satisﬁcing decision theory
by a) distinguishing between categorical and situational altruism, b) providing a discussion of participant attitude modes,
c) providing an explicit protocol for negotiation under the satisﬁcing regime, and d) providing examples that demonstrate
negotiation under the satisﬁcing paradigm.
Satisﬁcing game theory provides a new tool for the analysis
and design of multi-agent systems. It is particularly applicable
to negotiatory situations since, by substituting a mathematically
precise notion of being good enough for the notion of optimality,
it provides decision makers with ﬂexibility to adjust their choices
as they interact with each other. The theory is equally applicable
to cooperative and noncooperative scenarios.
When cooperation is essential in a multi-agent system, it is important to design the system according to principles that explicitly accommodate cooperation. However, under conventional
individual rationality-based approaches such as von Neumann–
Morgenstern game theory, it is difﬁcult to characterize cooperation, especially if it requires deferring preferences at one’s
own expense in order to beneﬁt others. But under the notion of
satisﬁcing rationality, giving deference is easy to characterize
and to specify via conditional preference relationships.
The appeal of optimization is a strongly entrenched attitude
that dominates current decision-making practice. There is great
comfort in following traditional paths, especially when those
paths are founded on such a rich and enduring tradition as individual rationality affords. But when synthesizing an artiﬁcial
negotiatory system, the designer has the opportunity to impose
upon the agents a more socially accommodating paradigm. The
satisﬁcing game theory presented in this paper provides a sociological decision-making mechanism that seamlessly accounts
for group and individual interests, and provides a rich framework
for negotiation to occur between agents who share common interests and who are willing to give deference to each other.
Rather than depending upon the noncooperative equilibria deﬁned (even if only approximately) by individual beneﬁt, this
alternative may lead to the more socially realistic and valuable
equilibria of shared interests and acceptable compromises.
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